Ramos Loses Sevilla When the Sellers Demand Cash First

Sergio Ramos spent June 1 in a Seville hotel insisting his group had not cheated anyone after a planned €444 million buy of Sevilla FC collapsed in late May. The five families who control most of the shares wanted cash for those shares on signing. His last paper put a €120 million capital increase in front of that cash.

Those families called it months of deceit and asked for a penalty. Ramos said the share price never moved, the sale contract was never signed, and he was still in the city, ready to talk.

The Five Families Who Still Hold the Shares

The public fight was named after a player. The stock that was for sale sits with a local block that has run Sevilla, in shifting combinations, since the mid-1990s: the Castro, Guijarro, Carrión, Alés and Del Nido Benavente families. José María del Nido Benavente, the former president and still the largest individual holder, signed the June 1 letter with the others. His son, José María del Nido Carrasco, remains club president and said later he had no part in the sale talks.

On January 26, two of those groups signed a letter of intent with Ramos and Five Eleven Capital to sell up to 85% of the club, with the rest of the main block joining later. The price per share was to be paid in cash. A capital increase of €80 million would follow, because the sellers said every serious bidder had to put fresh money into the club after the transfer of shares, not instead of paying them.

THE SELLING BLOCK

• Castro: José Castro, a former president, sits in the group often called the Utrera block with Guijarro and Alés.
• Carrión: Heirs of Rafael Carrión, still on the board through the family stake.
• Alés: Heirs of former president Roberto Alés, part of the same local majority.
• Guijarro: A long-running family holding inside that majority.
• Del Nido Benavente: The former president whose own stake, plus allies, was treated as necessary to reach 85%.

Around that core sits a separate 14% once held by 777 Partners and now with insurer A-CAP after that fund’s collapse. The families spent years arguing with each other. On June 1 they spoke with one voice, because the last Ramos paper no longer paid them first.

What Changed in the Hotel Meeting

By May 12 the two sides had a deal in principle around €444 million for 85%, after a due diligence run that started on February 9 and produced a report by April 13. Exclusivity ran to May 31. On May 27, with days left on that clock, Ramos’s team walked into a Seville meeting with a different structure.

The families say he told them he would not complete the signed terms, that Mexican group DMI was now the only investor, and that Five Eleven was no longer the buyer. In their account he wanted about 30,000 shares, not the 86,000 previously discussed, for €100 million, then a €120 million capital increase that would take him to 42% and control, then on toward 60%. Shares left outside that path, they argued, would be diluted.

Ramos told reporters the share price was still €3,175, the target was still 85%, and the only change that mattered was timing. His first paper, he said, sent €279 million to shareholders plus an €80 million capital increase. The last paper paid shareholders in two steps, €105 million to €141 million first and at least €137 million second, and raised the capital increase to €120 million. Banco Santander and another international bank, he said, had shown the money was there.

THE LAST OFFER, TWO VERSIONS

People briefed on Ramos’s side put that last package at €335 million in total, as €120 million into the club, €133 million to shareholders, and €82 million deferred. The families heard a cut, not a refinement. People at LaLiga who know the file have said a €120 million increase would sit close to several years of losses and would help the club’s financial fair play position. That does not answer the sellers’ question, which was when they get paid.

DMI Arrives After Five Eleven Fades

Five Eleven Capital is a Madrid football investment firm. Argentine businessman Martín Ink founded it in January 2024 with Andrés Tortarolo, and Ramos became the public partner after the two men crossed paths while Ramos was at Monterrey. Ink sat in the May rooms. By May 27 the families say he was gone as a buyer, reduced to advice, while a Mexican real estate group took the chair.

That group is DMI, run by Álvaro Leaño Espinosa with his brothers Eduardo and Juan José. It has spent three decades on housing, malls and mixed-use projects in Mexico, including the Andares complex in Guadalajara. DMI had already sounded out Valencia over stadium land, and it had contacted Sevilla on its own in October 2025, before it was tied to Ramos. At the May 27 meeting it was represented by lawyer Roberto Álvarez.

Ramos said DMI had been in the deal from the first day and that leaks had twisted that fact. The letter says commitment letters shown in January came from three international groups, none of them DMI, and that DMI only appeared in the late meetings as a “new investor” used to justify delays and a lower cash price. The families also wrote that a property group in that seat raised questions about Sevilla’s own real estate, including the stadium and training ground.

Ink’s firm had already slipped at smaller targets. It took a 10% slice of Hungarian club Debreceni, then left that register months later when the rest of the money did not arrive. That history sat in the room when Five Eleven’s name dropped off the term sheet and a Guadalajara developer’s name replaced it.

Sevilla Logged 82 Million, Then 54 Million

The rewrite did not come from nowhere. Sevilla has been posting heavy losses since European income fell away, and the May talks assumed about €88 million of net financial debt. Goldman Sachs is already inside that structure: €108 million arranged through Mount Street Mortgage Services, plus a €70 million participative loan that can sit in equity. Those loans, and a CVC facility, are what have kept the club out of insolvency court.

THE BOOKS THE BIDDERS OPENED

• 2023-24: The club itself reported almost 82 million euros in losses after revenue dropped when UEFA money shrank.
• 2024-25: Shareholders later approved another year in the red, on accounts the finance director said were audited with a clean opinion.
• Debt in the May talks: About €88 million net, against a much larger gross figure once the Goldman lines are counted in full.
• Fair play pressure: People at the league put a €120 million increase near the hole left by several losing years.

Clubs have to file LaLiga’s published annual accounts on a fixed cycle, so this was not a private rumour. Ramos said the audit showed a very delicate position, with large losses in the latest season and more losses expected. The families answered that the accounts are on the club website, that the due diligence reports were satisfactory, and that a weak balance sheet is not a licence to reopen a price already accepted.

Ramos Draws a Line at Torre Sevilla

The families published first, on the morning of June 1, in a 14-point note that used the words deceit, fraudulent conduct and lack of respect. They said Ramos’s name had been the personal guarantee for the January letter, that he had enjoyed exclusivity from January to May 31, and that the May 27 turn had been prepared for months. They had already sent him and Five Eleven a claim for the penalty clause, plus a warning to stop talking about information seen in due diligence.

Ramos answered that afternoon at Hotel Torre Sevilla. He said a share purchase agreement was never signed, only a letter of intent and a verbal understanding, so there was no breach that could trigger a payout. He also said LaLiga and his own advisers had pushed the capital increase from €80 million to €120 million before June 30. LaLiga later said it recommended no such figure. Officials there described a March meeting with Five Eleven as a numbers session, not an order to rewrite the sellers’ cheque.

I want to make it clear that I’m here to talk only about Sevilla. We’ve presented a very solid project, the best one for Sevilla to regain its rightful place. We are not stealing or deceiving anyone.

Sergio Ramos, former Spain defender, Hotel Torre Sevilla, June 1, 2026

He added that he was still in Seville and willing to listen, and that his camp had not broken any term of the talks. The fraud claims that followed the collapse did not move the families. In the stands the letter did not land as a closing argument either. Supporters who have watched those same surnames run three poor seasons heard a cash-first defence, and they put Del Nido Benavente’s signature on the note next to Castro’s as the old board closing ranks.

The Club’s Creditor Now Runs the Auction

Exclusivity died on May 31. The families said they were already reopening files that had sat on ice. By the end of July they had given Goldman Sachs an exclusive mandate to sell up to 85%, after earlier advice from JB Capital Markets. The bank is also the club’s main creditor, which puts the same house on both sides of the ledger: recover the loans, and find a buyer who will put about €80 million into a capital increase while paying the families.

Riverside Management Group, a US investor that has circled Sevilla since 2024, said in August it still had €420.5 million on the table and could close in 45 days. Alberto Pérez-Solano, who advises the shareholders, called that approach unfit and pointed the process back to Goldman. The bank’s brief is to finish a sale by the end of 2026 or early 2027.

FROM THE LETTER OF INTENT TO THE MANDATE

1. January 26, 2026: Two shareholder groups sign a letter of intent with Ramos and Five Eleven for up to 85%, cash on the shares, then an €80 million capital increase.
2. February 9, 2026: Due diligence begins, runs 45 days, then gets two extra weeks, with a report dated April 13.
3. May 11-12, 2026: After long meetings in Seville, the sides reach a deal in principle around €444 million.
4. May 27, 2026: Ramos’s team tables the rewritten paper. The families treat the talks as broken.
5. June 1, 2026: The five families publish the 14-point letter. Ramos answers at Torre Sevilla and leaves the offer open.
6. Late July 2026: The same families give Goldman Sachs an exclusive mandate to find another buyer for that 85%.

Before the new season the club sold players, including Tanguy Nianzou and Rafa Mir, to get the next squad registered under league payroll rules. That is what a missed recapitalisation looks like in June and July: not a press conference, a trimmed wage bill.

A 13th-Place Finish and No New Owner

Sevilla ended 2025/26 in 13th, on 43 points from 12 wins, 7 draws and 19 defeats, with 46 goals scored and 60 conceded. The club has seven Europa League titles and no European football in the accounts that drove this sale. Ramos made 87 appearances across two spells after a first-team debut in February 2004, left for Real Madrid, came back in 2023, then went to Monterrey and became a free agent in December.

On September 8, Del Nido Carrasco said net debt had come down from €90 million in early July to €60 million, and that a capital increase would speed things up but was not required for the current plan. Shareholders, in the year already closed, had approved 54 million euros in losses. He also said he had nothing to do with the sale, and that he was sticking to the June letter.

Ramos is no longer in the exclusive chair. The families still want to be paid for the stock they hold. Goldman Sachs now runs the clock they would not give him.